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1. Introduction
In spite of dramatic cuts in tariffs and technological progress with regard to trans-
port infrastructure, costs of cross-border goods trade are still surprisingly high (see
Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004). Trade costs may to some extent shield markets
from foreign competitors so that it becomes attractive for firms to locate in the
larger market where the majority of customers resides. Obviously, this has crucial
implications for tax competition as governments in large markets can use this
location advantage to attract foreign firms and charge higher tax rates.
A second important fact that governments have to take into account when
choosing the optimal capital income tax rate is imperfect labour markets.
Specifically in continental Europe, countries have witnessed substantial and per-
sistent levels of unemployment. How should governments ideally adjust their tax
rate on mobile capital to declining trade costs that deepen the integration of
markets if labour markets do not work perfectly? This question is at the heart of
this paper. We provide a framework that helps understand better the interplay
between labour market frictions and trade liberalization for tax competition.
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Our model considers two countries that produce a homogeneous traditional and
a composite industrial good with the inputs capital and labour. While labour is
assumed to be mobile only between domestic sectors, capital can also cross inter-
national borders. As trade in industrial varieties is subject to trade costs, our model
features the well-known home market effect. We follow Akerlof and Yellen (1990)
and in particular Kreickemeier and Nelson (2006) and Grossman and Helpman
(2008) in modeling labour market imperfection by means of fair wage preferences
of individuals.1 This introduces an elegant link between relative factor prices and
unemployment which is central to a large set of labour market rigidities (e.g.,
minimum wages, collective bargaining). The advantage of the Akerlof-Yellen ap-
proach lies in its single (fair wage) parameter that describes the intensity of the
labour market imperfection. Moreover, relative factor prices and unemployment
can be endogenously determined in general equilibrium. Finally, our model allows
for differences in market size and the degree of labour market rigidity between
countries.
The paper is related to at least three strands of literature. First, there are a
number of papers that study the tax competition game in a framework with imper-
fect product markets and trade costs. A general feature of these models is that firms
find it attractive to agglomerate in one location for sufficiently low impediments to
trade. In that case, governments can tax the agglomeration rent without any dis-
tortions. This point has been made by Ludema and Wooton (2000), Kind et al.
(2000) and—for partial agglomeration—by Borck and Pflu¨ger (2006). Baldwin and
Krugman (2004) draw similar conclusions and point out in addition that tax
coordination will be harmful to at least one country. Ottaviano and van Ypersele
(2005) contribute a full-fledged welfare analysis and show that tax competition
might enhance efficiency by improving the allocation of firms. A second strand
looks at tax competition with rigid labour markets in a setting without trade costs
and perfect competition on the product market (see, e.g. Fuest and Huber, 1999).
Finally, the ‘bidding for firms’ literature considers rigid labour markets as well (see,
e.g. Barros and Cabral, 2000, Bjorvatn and Eckel, 2006, and Haufler and
Mittermaier, 2011). The central feature of this literature is that governments try
to attract a single firm. None of these papers, however, looks at the interrelation
between trade liberalization and rigid labour markets for tax competition.
Against this background, our paper delivers two main contributions to the
existing literature. First, we show that a symmetric increase in the labour market
rigidity of two identical countries renders tax competition more severe and reduces
equilibrium tax rates for all levels of trade costs. A similar effect materializes if trade
barriers are reduced. Furthermore, the impact of rigid labour markets and that of
trade liberalization on equilibrium tax rates are interdependent. Higher trade
..........................................................................................................................................................................
1 See Bewley (2005), Ga¨chter and Fehr (2002), Howitt (2002), Luttmer (2005), and Milkovich and
Newman (2005) for evidence on this mechanism.
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impediments lead to a stronger responsiveness of equilibrium capital income tax
rates with respect to changes in labour market rigidities than lower ones.
Second, we study the role of differences in market size and labour market rigidity
for tax competition in this setup. Our results suggest that the advantage of having
the larger market relative to the disadvantage of possessing a more constrained
labour market crucially depends on the level of trade costs. While low trade barriers
stress the market size advantage, higher trade barriers amplify the relative import-
ance of labour market frictions. This is reflected in the optimal Nash tax rate.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Next, we present the model
with taxes on capital income and labour market imperfection. Section 3 provides
analytical results in the short run where capital mobility is ruled out and only trade
in goods is possible. In Section 4, we analyse the impact of fair wage preferences on
the equilibrium share of firms and on Nash tax rates. Section 5 concludes.
2. The model
Consider a world with two countries i= h, f, populated by two types of individuals.
Workers supply one efficiency unit of labour, Li, and capital owners offer one unit
of capital, Ki. We assume that both workers and capital owners are immobile
internationally. However, capital itself can be moved across borders and employed
in either country. These production factors are used to produce two tradable goods,
X and Y. One sector operates under perfect competition and produces a homoge-
neous traditional good (Y) while the other sector is characterized by monopolistic
competition. Manufacturing firms produce industrial varieties v which are aggre-
gated to the composite commodity X. We assume that trade of Y is free while trade
in X is subject to iceberg-type trade costs t> 1. This implies that t units have to be
shipped for one unit to arrive at its final destination abroad. Furthermore, we
follow Martin and Rogers (1995) in assuming that capital owners globally diversify
their capital to earn the average return. Since foreign income is always repatriated,
this fixes market size despite capital mobility. These simplifications in particular
allow a closed-form solution of the endogenous allocation of industry. However,
the assumption of an imperfect labour market introduces complexity that con-
strains us to numerical solutions with respect to Nash tax rates in the long run.
The building blocks of the model are laid out in more detail in the sequel of this
section.
2.1 Preferences
Individual utility in country i is given by
Oi ¼  lnðCXiÞ þ CYi þ lnðGiÞ;  > 0; ð1Þ
where CXi ¼
Ð
v2VexiðvÞð1Þ=dv =ð1Þ is a CES-aggregator capturing demand for
industrial goods and CYi denotes aggregate demand for the traditional good. The
parameter  represents the constant elasticity of substitution between any two
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industrial varieties,  captures the preference for industrial relative to traditional
goods,exiðvÞ is demand for variety v in country i and V reflects the mass of industrial
products in both countries. In addition, households derive utility from consuming
a public good Gi. The private budget constraint is given by
Ei ¼
ð
v2V
epiðvÞexiðvÞdv þ PYiCYi ð2Þ
where epiðvÞ and PYi describe consumer prices of a manufactured variety and the
traditional good, respectively. Note that Ei captures income net of taxes. It is
convenient to choose Y as nume´raire so that its price equals one. Defining
PXi 
Ð
v2VepiðvÞ1dv as the CES-price index, maximizing (1) subject to (2) yields
CXi ¼ 
PXi
; CYi ¼ Ei  ; exiðvÞ ¼ epiðvÞ=PXi: ð3Þ
2.2 Technology
There is perfect competition in the traditional sector and we assume that one
efficiency unit of labour is necessary to produce a single unit of the traditional
good, so that LYi=Yi. As trade in Y is not subject to any barriers and we focus on
scenarios where both regions always produce Y, the price of the traditional good is
unity everywhere. Together with the assumption that labour is mobile between
domestic sectors (but not internationally), we get wi= 1.
In the industrial sector, both capital K and labour L are necessary for production.
We use the assumption of Flam and Helpman (1987) that one unit of capital is
required for firm setup whereas labour serves as the variable input. Let c denote the
variable input coefficient so that the aggregate production of variety v in country i
is Xi(v) = LXi(v)/c.
With respect to pricing behaviour, all firms act as monopolists setting profit
maximizing prices as a fixed mark-up over marginal costs. With constant price
elasticity of substitution, identical technology across firms and iceberg-type trans-
port costs for industrial varieties, consumer prices for the domestic and the export
market are given by epdi ¼ c=ð1 1=Þ and epei ¼ ðcÞ=ð1 1=Þ, respectively. This
implies that it is optimal for all firms to charge identical producer prices
pi ¼epdi ¼epei=. In equilibrium, free entry of firms drives down pure profits to
zero such that2
i ¼ ðpi  cÞXi  ri ¼ 0: ð4Þ
..........................................................................................................................................................................
2 Although capital supply is exogenous in our model, we should nevertheless think of this as a free entry
equilibrium. Firms enter the market and compete with others for scarce capital until the price for this
factor breaks even with operating profits. This will occur exactly where the supplied units of capital
equals the number of firms. By applying the zero-profit condition, we neglect the integer problem and
treat firm numbers as continuous (see Baldwin, 1988).
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Setting c= 1 1/ normalizes producer prices to unity and 1/ becomes the (op-
erating) profit margin for a unit of output sold. We thus infer from (4) that the cost
of capital (ri) equals operating profits (Xi/) in equilibrium.
It becomes obvious from firms’ pricing behaviour that consumers have to bear
trade costs entirely. Hence, demand for a domestically produced variety is lower
abroad as long as t> 1. This feature is central for the home market effect because
firms benefit from producing in the larger market where they face higher demand
for their products and thus earn higher operating profits in the absence of capital
mobility.
2.3 Labour markets
We assume labour markets to be imperfect due to fair wage preferences of indivi-
duals. This approach has gained increasing support in the literature for good
reasons. Apart from the fact that there is substantial (experimental) evidence for
such preferences (Ga¨chter and Fehr, 2002, or Bewley, 2005), the approach possesses
two useful features. First, unemployment and factor price differentials can be
determined endogenously in equilibrium. And, second, the fair wage parameter
can easily be interpreted to measure the rigidity of relative factor prices. In other
words, the fair wage mechanism introduces an elegant link between factor price
compression and unemployment—a feature that is central to most other labour
market rigidities (e.g. minimum wages or collective bargaining). Hence, we claim
that our results should generally hold when labour market rigidity compresses
relative factor prices.
The key feature of the fair wage-effort mechanism is that individuals have
a preference for being remunerated in a fair way relative to a reference group.
In terms of our model, workers compare their wage to operating profits of
the firm they are working for. Those profits accrue solely to capital owners (who
also own the firm). While standard labour market models assume that
workers compare their wages to those of co-workers, recent work has
stressed that firm profitability (also) serves as an important determinant for
workers’ expectations of fair remuneration. Danthine and Kurmann (2007) con-
clude after a detailed literature review that ‘the better (worse) the firm is doing, the
more (less) the worker expects to be paid in exchange for a given level of effort’
(p.858).3
Noting that operating profits are equal to ri in equilibrium, the fair wage w

i is
determined in the following way:
wi ¼ iri þ ð1 iÞ 1 uið1 biÞ½ wi: ð5Þ
..........................................................................................................................................................................
3 See also Egger and Kreickemeier (2009) for a theoretical model with fair wages and operating profits as
workers’ reference.
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Asterisks identify the fair level, whereas ri and wi denote market prices. The fair
wage equation above shows that workers attach a certain weight i2 [0, 1] to the
reference income which we refer to as the fair wage parameter. The remaining
weight, 1 i is put on the value of the outside option which is the expected
market income for labour, where ui reflects the unemployment rate and bi is the
replacement rate every individual gets if unemployed.4 While a higher unemploy-
ment rate reduces the value of the outside option, an increase in the average
replacement rate renders joblessness less costly. Hence, the fair wage declines in
ui and rises in bi.
A further point needs highlighting. In contrast to (5), one could assume that
workers use after-tax operating profits as a reference in determining their fair wage
level. As we discuss below, this assumption is crucial for the direction of change in
unemployment when tax rates change, but innocent for the impact of trade liber-
alization on Nash tax rates at a given level of labour market rigidity. Since this is the
focal point of our analysis, we prefer to keep the analysis as simple as possible by
abstracting from a direct tax effect on unemployment. Nevertheless, we extensively
explore in Appendix 1 how our main results would be affected if net-of-tax op-
erating profits were used in the fair-wage constraint.5
In a next step, we need to determine the wage level that maximizes firms’ profits.
Following Akerlof and Yellen (1990), individuals are assumed to reduce their work
effort proportionally if they are remunerated less than the fair level. For workers, we
have the following effort function,
eLi ¼ min wi
wi
; 1
 
; ð6Þ
where normal effort has been set to unity.6 According to this functional form, firms
cannot influence wages per efficiency unit of labour supply. We can thus safely
assume that firms choose to pay the fair wage (normalized to unity) as doing so
does not reduce their profits. As an immediate consequence, workers always pro-
vide normal effort. We restrict our analysis to parameter constellations where the
return to capital always exceeds the remuneration to labour to ensure that the
..........................................................................................................................................................................
4 To avoid further distortions, we assume that unemployment benefits are financed in a lump-sum
fashion.
5 A third specification could be to consider a general source-based tax on all income. Then, the labour
portion of it would be neutral with labour being immobile internationally. A tax falling on both wages
and profit would cancel out in (5).
6 The term eLi is usually referred to as the effort norm in the literature. Kreickemeier and Nelson (2006)
suggest to introduce a distance term W"Li eLiW into the utility function to capture costs of deviating
from the norm. As it turns out to be optimal to always supply effort "Li according to the norm eLi, the
term disappears from the utility maximization problem. We have thus suppressed it from our analysis
for the sake of simplicity.
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labour market constraint binds (with i> 0). The equilibrium is then characterized
by the following features:
ui > 0 ð7Þ
ri > r

i > wi ¼ wi : ð8Þ
Inserting (7) and (8) into (5) yields the unemployment rate of workers
ui ¼ eiðri  1Þ: ð9Þ
where ei ¼ i=½ð1 iÞð1 biÞ. As wages have been normalized to unity, ri should
be interpreted as the factor price differential. Since 04 ui4 1, the return to capital
is bound by ri 2 ½1; 1þ ei1. It is evident from (9) that unemployment ceteris
paribus rises in ri.
2.4 Governments
We assume governments to behave benevolently by maximizing welfare. In our
model, welfare in country i is determined in a utilitarian way by summing over
workers Li and capital owners Ki as
Wi ¼  ln 1 ln Pið Þ þ Ei½  Li 1 uið Þ þ Ki½  þ Li þ Kið Þ ln Gið Þ; ð10Þ
where [(ln  1 ln Pi) + Ei] [Li(1 ui) +Ki] is aggregate indirect utility from
private consumption and Gi denotes aggregate expenditures on a public good. Gi is
financed by means of a source tax ti on capital income. The government budget is
assumed to be balanced such that
Gi ¼ tirisnK;
where sn is the share of firms in country i and K the global capital stock.
7 Note
that Gi enters the welfare function in logarithmic form to avoid income
effects.8 When setting the tax rate, the government takes into account the relation-
ship between a lower wage income of workers (relative to capital income) and
unemployment. In contrast, individuals do not consider the impact of their behav-
iour and their effort reduction in response to unfair wage payments on the un-
employment rate.
..........................................................................................................................................................................
7 In the short run, snK coincides with Ki. However, we have to use the former, more general notation as
we assume that capital owners invest equally domestically and abroad. Hence, tax revenues will also be
generated from domestically employed capital that is owned by foreigners.
8 See Baldwin, et al., 2003, p.392. While standard assumptions exclude income effects from the model,
taxation could re-introduce them because governments spend tax revenue from foreign owned capital
domestically. The logarithmic treatment of Gi in the welfare function avoids this problem.
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3. Short-run effects of capital income taxation
Before turning to the long-run allocation of firms and tax competition, we derive
the equilibrium capital return with fixed capital allocation, but with potential trade
in both goods. This is useful to study the implications of the fair wage constraint for
relative factor prices and unemployment. First of all, we are interested in the short-
run capital return rh. Using the insight that rh=Xh/ along with optimal demand
for domestic and foreign varieties yields9
rh ¼ 

ð1 uhÞLh þ Kh
Kh þ Kf þ 
ð1 uf ÞLf þ Kf
Kf þ Kh
 
; ð11Þ
where  t1 ranges between zero and unity reflecting the freeness of trade. In
particular, = 0 implies prohibitively high trade costs, whereas at = 1 trade is
completely free. In order to get a first idea of how the model works, we take a look
at the impact of fair wage preferences on the factor price differential and the
unemployment rate. The result is summarized in Proposition 1:10
Proposition 1 A higher fair wage parameter h reduces capital returns both domes-
tically and abroad by causing higher unemployment in country h. While uh unam-
biguously increases, the reduction in demand from country h for varieties produced
in country f can partly be offset by higher employment levels there. Raising the
replacement rate bh exerts similar effects.
Proof See Appendix 2. h
The intuition can best be demonstrated by means of (5). With a higher h, this
equation can only hold if either rh declines or uh rises. However, we know from (9)
that these variables are interdependent. In fact, unemployment exerts a negative
impact on rh by reducing demand for a variety produced in country h. In equilib-
rium, demand gross of trade costs equals production Xh which is a function of
unemployment. Higher unemployment unambiguously reduces demand for each
variety and thus operating profits. This effect also spills over to the other country as
foreign firms face lower demand from country h. Applying the same reasoning for a
marginal increase in bh, it is evident from (9) that uh rises in bh implying a factor
price compression effect. While a higher fair wage parameter in country h unam-
biguously increases unemployment in country h, it improves employment in coun-
try f (unless trade costs are prohibitively high). Intuitively, a reduction in rf due to a
higher h relaxes the fair wage constraint in country f allowing for a lower un-
employment rate.
With our specification of the fair wage constraint capital income taxes do not
affect unemployment in the short run. The reason is that capital cannot be
..........................................................................................................................................................................
9 Note that Xh= (Lh(1 uh) +Kh) xh+ (Lf(1 uf) +Kf)txf. As firms are identical, we suppress the index
for varieties.
10 This proposition generalizes the result in Egger and Seidel (2008) to asymmetric country size.
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reallocated internationally rendering relative factor prices unaffected. At a given
labour market rigidity as captured by the fair wage parameter, unemployment
could only change, if the capital rental changed relative to wages (see (9)). Recall
that these results are sensitive to the assumption whether gross or net capital
returns matter for determining the fair wage level (see Appendix 1). Obviously,
using after-tax capital returns implies lower unemployment when ti is raised.
4. Long-run equilibrium
We now allow capital owners to change the allocation of their capital in response to
differences in after-tax capital rentals across countries. This renders the allocation
of industrial firms an endogenous variable. The next subsection analyses the role of
trade liberalization and imperfect labour markets for tax base responsiveness before
we solve the model for both symmetric and asymmetric specifications numerically.
4.1 Fair wages and tax base sensitivity
To solve the model for its long-run equilibrium share of firms, sn, we substitute
Kh=K ¼ sn and Kf =K ¼ 1 sn into the short-run capital return (11) and employ
the location condition (1 th)rh= (1 tf)rf. However, we restrict our comparative
static analysis to identical countries with respect to market size (L= Lh= Lf,
K=Kh=Kf) and fair wage parameters (=h=f) for two reasons. First, it
allows us to reduce the complexity of the expressions. And second, it suits better
for explaining the long-run mechanism of the model. Solving the location condi-
tion for sn yields
sn ¼ 1
2
1 th  tf
2 th  tf
1þ 
1 
 2
 2

 n
eL th  tf 
2 th  tf
 !
; ð12Þ
where n denotes the number of globally active firms. We can illustrate several
points by means of (12). First, we only observe a deviation from the symmetric
distribution of firms if equilibrium taxes differ between countries. Second, it is
straightforward to show that an increase in any tax rate clearly reduces the share of
firms in that country (unless the tax rate in the other region is unity):
@sn
@th
¼  1 tf
  1þ1 	2þ2  neL
2 th  tf
 2  0:
Third, the magnitude of this effect increases in  at exogenous tax rates,
@2sn
@th@
¼  1þ 
1 ð Þ3
4 1 tf
 
2 th  tf
 2  0:
These mechanisms are known from the literature (Baldwin, et al., 2003, p.381) and
also hold true with imperfect labour markets in our model. Capital becomes more
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sensitive to tax changes if trade costs decline as it is then more attractive for firms to
serve the domestic market from abroad.11
More importantly, however, we want to focus on the impact of the fair wage
constraint on the equilibrium industry share sn. Proposition 2 summarizes our
findings.
Proposition 2 For countries that are identical with respect to endowments and fair
wage preferences, an increase in the fair wage parameter  reduces (increases) sn if
th> tf (tf> th). Similar to trade liberalization, it makes the location of capital more
elastic with respect to changes in taxes.
Proof It is straightforward to show that
@sn
@
¼  
 n
L
1 bð Þ 1 ð Þ2
th  tf
2 th  tf T 0
and
@2sn
@th@
¼ 
2  n
L
1bð Þ 1ð Þ2 1 tf
 
2 th  tf
 2  0
at exogenous tax rates. h
What is the intuition for this result? We know from the location condition that
at th> tf the capital return in country hmust exceed the one in country f. Increasing
fair wage preferences in both countries now generates more unemployment in
country h than in country f as the factor price differential is higher there. Hence,
a higher level of unemployment is required to meet the fair wage constraint redu-
cing capital returns more in country h. As a consequence, more firms relocate from
country h to country f than with perfect labour markets.12
In contrast to the short run, unilaterally increasing the capital income tax th
exhibits unemployment effects in the long run. We know that a higher tax rate in
country h drives firms abroad so that rh rises and rf falls. According to (9) and at
given fair wage parameters, this causes more unemployment in h and less un-
employment in f.
..........................................................................................................................................................................
11 In fact, trade costs impede the mobility of capital in an indirect way as their level affects profits to
different extents when relocating due to the home market effect. Hence, the effect of trade costs on
capital flows is similar to that of costs of capital mobility. With respect to the latter, Razin and Sadka
(1991) showed that higher impediments to capital mobility allow governments to set higher tax rates
which enhance welfare.
12 Note that in the presence of endowment differences between countries, a symmetric increase in the fair
wage parameter may affect outcome even at th= tf. We discuss the role of different country size in
Appendix 3.
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4.2 Tax competition
Let us now analyse the implications of fair wage preferences for tax competition.
Unfortunately, an analytical treatment of this is infeasible, but we can explore the
features of the model by means of numerical analysis. Since the equilibrium alloca-
tion of capital crucially depends on trade freeness , we need to determine equilib-
rium taxes and capital allocation at any level of .13 We do so by implementing a
grid search over th, tf2 [0, 0.01, . . . , 0.99, 1] for each 2 [0, 0.01, . . . , 0.99]. Hence,
we search for Nash equilibrium tax rates across 1012100 = 1, 020, 100 model solu-
tions for each level of fair wage preference parameter h and f so as to maximize
social welfare. In particular, our focus is on the impact of h and f on the Nash tax
rate.14
Figure 1(i) depicts Nash tax rates for countries of identical size and equal labour
market imperfection. Due to symmetry, equilibrium tax rates are identical in both
countries so that it suffices to plot the curves for one jurisdiction. The solid line
represents perfect labour markets as a benchmark (= 0), whereas the dashed line
shows Nash taxes for = 0.2. First, one clearly observes a race to the bottom of tax
rates when  rises. This is in line with the reported result in Section 3 that capital
becomes more footloose when trade freeness goes up. Second, an increase in the fair
wage parameter  reduces Nash tax rates relative to the benchmark case while the
race to the bottom in  is preserved. The latter is not surprising since we have
shown that  increases the responsiveness of capital reallocation with respect to tax
changes. Governments account for this by setting lower Nash tax rates. Notice that
the impact of trade liberalization and labour market imperfections on equilibrium
tax rates depend on each other. More specifically, the responsiveness of tax rates
with respect to labour market imperfections declines with trade liberalization (asso-
ciated with higher levels of  in Fig. 1). As the replacement rate exerts a similar
effect on unemployment, a higher level of b would shift the optimal tax curve
Fig. 1 Identical country size
..........................................................................................................................................................................
13 Although our model allows for full agglomeration of capital in principle, we exclude it from the
analysis. The reason is that we would need to shift from simultaneous to sequential tax setting to
establish equilibria. Obviously, this renders the results incomparable.
14We discuss the parameter choice for our numerical exercise in Appendix 4.
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further down (as long as > 0). Since there are no additional insights gained, we set
replacement rates to zero.
In Fig. 1(ii), we allow for differences in labour market imperfection across coun-
tries. While country h is assumed to possess a fair wage parameter of h= 0.2,
country f’s labour market works perfectly. We find that the more constrained
country h chooses a lower Nash tax rate than country f. The reason is that un-
employment reduces the attractiveness of this location for firms initially, so that a
lower tax rate can partly offset this disadvantage. However, the tax rate is higher
than with symmetrically constrained labour markets (= 0.2) in panel (i). As un-
employment in country h is lower with h= 0.2 and f= 0 than with = 0.2, capital
does not react as sensitively to tax changes. Hence, it pays off to levy higher taxes in
that country.15
In the next step, we study how the labour market constraint modifies both
countries’ reaction curves. We choose a constellation with intermediate trade
costs, = 0.5, and compare perfect labour markets, = 0, with identical fair wage
constraints in both jurisdictions, > 0. For expositional reasons, we choose a suffi-
ciently high fair wage parameter, = 0.5 for the latter case. Figure 2 illustrates that
unemployment shifts reaction curves inwards. This implies that both governments
set a lower Nash tax rate in equilibrium—as demonstrated in the analysis above.
Since both countries levy the same capital income tax in equilibrium,
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
th(t f)| =0
th(t f)| =0.5
tf(th)| =0.5
tf(th)| =0tf
th
Fig. 2 Reaction functions for = 0.5
..........................................................................................................................................................................
15 The fact that governments choose very high capital income tax rates at high levels of trade costs is
simply due to the functional form of our model. Intuitively, tax revenues from capital owners can be
distributed to every citizen by providing a public good. Hence, it generates higher aggregate welfare.
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unemployment rates are also identical across countries. With a symmetric Nash
equilibrium, however, unemployment rates would become different if we chose
increasingly different tax rates to the right and the left of the Nash equilibrium
in Fig. 2.
Finally, we assume country h to be larger than country f to analyse the role of
market size for tax competition when labour markets are imperfect. In Fig. 3 we
depict the same three fair wage scenarios as above. Figure 3(i) reports two scenar-
ios: one in which labour markets are perfect (= 0, displayed in black) and one in
which both countries possess the same labour market constraint (= 0.2, displayed
in grey). First, one observes that the larger country h (solid curves) charges a higher
tax rate in equilibrium, independently of . The tax differential reaches a maximum
for intermediate levels of trade freeness because the advantage of hosting the larger
market is maximal there. Second, for equally rigid labour markets Nash tax rates
are still lower relative to perfect labour markets because capital reacts more sen-
sitively to changes in tax rates, that is a marginal increase in taxes causes a higher
capital outflow. However, the larger country h still charges a higher tax rate than
country f.
Panel (ii) in Fig. 3 links differences in market size to differences in fair wage
preferences. Choosing a constellation in which the larger market also faces the
higher labour market imperfection (h= 0.2 and f= 0), we find that the un-
employment effect dominates the market size effect for high trade barriers.
Hence, Nash taxes fall short of their foreign counterpart. At some intermediate
level of , however, the advantage of possessing the larger market allows country h
to charge higher Nash tax rates than country f. Essentially, the level of trade freeness
determines the relative importance of the home market advantage over the disad-
vantage of having the more constrained labour market for tax competition.
All simulations indicate that stronger fair wage preferences imply a lower level of
welfare as tax rates have to be reduced more than with perfect labour markets.
Naturally, trade liberalization (an increase in ) unambiguously raises welfare as
less goods ‘melt’ on the way to consumers abroad. This leaves every household
better off due to higher consumption. A last point is also obvious from our analysis,
Fig. 3 Different country size
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namely that tax harmonization allows both countries to set their welfare maximiz-
ing capital income tax rates.
5. Conclusions
This paper has established the novel result that imperfect labour markets increase
tax base sensitivity to marginal changes in capital income taxes. In choosing the
welfare maximizing tax, governments account for the negative impact of un-
employment on firms’ profits by setting a lower rate as this would prevent extensive
relocation. The role of labour market rigidities for equilibrium tax rates on capital
income depends on the degree of liberalization of international goods transactions.
Stronger trade barriers render the capital tax base less responsive and, hence, capital
tax rates more responsive to changes in labour market rigidities.
Finally, we point out that country size matters for government behaviour.
Capital income taxes are higher in larger countries which is preserved if both
economies possess the same degree of labour market imperfection. If the larger
country has the more rigid labour market, however, it turns out that this imperfec-
tion depresses tax rates more for high levels of trade costs. Hence, for certain
parameter values, the fair wage-constrained large country sets a lower tax rate
than the unconstrained smaller country in autarky and higher tax rates with free
trade.
References
Akerlof, G.A. and Yellen, J.L. (1990) The fair-wage effort hypothesis and unemployment,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105, 255–83.
Anderson, J.E. and van Wincoop, E. (2004) Trade costs, Journal of Economic Literature, 42,
691–751.
Baldwin, R.E. (1988) Hysteresis in import prices: the beachhead effect, American Economic
Review, 78, 773–85.
Baldwin, R.E., Forslid, R., Martin, P., Ottaviano, G.I.P., and Robert-Nicoud, F. (2003)
Economic Geography and Public Policy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
Baldwin, R.E. and Krugman, P. (2004) Agglomeration, integration and tax harmonization,
European Economic Review, 48, 1–23.
Barros, P. and Cabral, L. (2000) Competing for foreign direct investment, Review of
International Economics, 8, 360–71.
Bewley, T. (2005) Fairness, reciprocity, and wage rigidity, in H. Gintis, S. Bowles, R. Boyd,
and E. Fehr (eds) Moral Sentiments and Material Interests: The Foundations of Cooperation in
Economic Life, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Bjorvatn, K. and Eckel, C. (2006) Policy competition for foreign direct investment between
asymmetric countries, European Economic Review, 50, 1891–1907.
Borck, R. and Pflu¨ger, M. (2006) Agglomeration and tax competition, European Economic
Review, 50, 647–68.
Danthine, J.P. and Kurmann, A. (2007) The macroeconomic consequences of reciprocity in
labor relations, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 109, 857–81.
p. egger and t. seidel 735
Egger, H. and Kreickemeier, U. (2009) Fairness, trade, and inequality, mimeo, Department
of Economics, University of Tu¨bingen.
Egger, P. and Seidel, T. (2008) Agglomeration and fair wages, Canadian Journal of
Economics, 41, 271–91.
Flam, H. and Helpman, E. (1987) Industrial policy under monopolistic competition, Journal
of International Economics, 22, 79–102.
Fuest, C. and Huber, B. (1999) Tax coordination and unemployment, International Tax and
Public Finance, 6, 7–26.
Ga¨chter, S. and Fehr, E. (2002) Fairness in the labour market: a survey of experimental
results, in F. Bolle and M. Lehmann-Waffenschmidt (eds) Surveys in Experimental Economics:
Bargaining, Cooperation and Election Stock Markets, Physica Verlag, Heidelberg.
Grossman, G.M. and Helpman, E. (2008) Fair wages and foreign sourcing, in E. Helpman,
D. Marin, and T. Verdier (eds) The Organization of Firms in a Global Economy, Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Haufler, A. and Mittermaier, F. (2011) Unionisation triggers tax incentives to attract foreign
direct investment, Economic Journal, forthcoming.
Howitt, P. (2002) Looking inside the labor market: a review article, Journal of Economic
Literature, 40, 125–38.
Kind, H.J., Midelfart Knarvik, K.H., and Schjelderup, G. (2000) Competing for capital in a
‘lumpy’ world, Journal of Public Economics, 78, 253–74.
Kreickemeier, U. and Nelson, D. (2006) Fair wages, unemployment and technological
change in a global economy, Journal of International Economics, 70, 451–69.
Ludema, R.D. and Wooton, I. (2000) Economic geography and the fiscal effects of regional
integration, Journal of International Economics, 52, 331–57.
Luttmer, E.F.P. (2005) Neighbors as negatives: relative earnings and well-being, Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 120, 963–1002.
Martin, P. and Rogers, C.A. (1995) Industrial location and public infrastructure, Journal of
International Economics, 39, 335–51.
Milkovich, G.T. and Newman, J.M. (2005) Compensation, McGraw Hill, New York, NY.
Ottaviano, G.I.P. and van Ypersele, T. (2005) Market size and tax competition, Journal of
International Economics, 67, 25–46.
Pflu¨ger, M. (2004) A simple, analytically solvable, Chamberlinian agglomeration model,
Regional Science and Urban Economics, 34, 565–73.
Razin, A. and Sadka, E. (1991) Efficient investment incentives in the presence of capital
flight, Journal of International Economics, 31, 171–81.
Appendix
1. Using after-tax capital returns in the fair wage constraint
Instead of using the gross capital return as the reference income for workers, one
could modify the model by basing the fair wage constraint on the net capital return.
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However, this would change the tax competition results only quantitatively. The
fair wage in country i would then read
wi ¼ i 1 tið Þri þ 1 ið Þ 1 ui 1 bið Þ½ wi;
and unemployment would be determined by the net capital return so that
ui ¼ ei ri 1 tið Þ  1½ :
As an immediate consequence of this, governments could reduce unemployment
via higher tax rates in the short run. The simple reason is that the gross returns are
fixed due to the fact that capital cannot be shifted abroad to avoid the tax. Hence,
the outcome for unemployment is qualitatively different in the net capital return-
based model from the benchmark case.
Unemployment effects also differ between these two specification in the long-run
perspective. In fact, with a net capital return-based fair wage constraint a unilateral
increase in capital income taxes would—as in the short run—reduce unemploy-
ment again (while it would have increased unemployment in the paper specifica-
tion). The difference to the short run, though, is that capital would be shifted
abroad so that ri would rise. Nevertheless, the net return remains on a lower
level than before the tax increase in country i. Hence, governments would have
to increase taxes more in order to achieve the same reduction in the unemployment
rate as without international capital mobility.
Despite these fundamental differences in unemployment effects, long-run Nash
tax rates would only be affected quantitatively. In particular, they would be higher
than with gross capital returns as the reference in the fair wage constraint.
Intuitively, tax increases would not only drive capital out of the jurisdiction, but
they would also reduce unemployment. As this second effect exerts a positive
impact on welfare, governments would not set tax rates as low as in the absence
of this effect. With positive unemployment, however, Nash tax rates would fall
short of their counterpart with perfect labour markets.
2. Proof of Proposition 1
Defining khKh+Kf, kfKf+Kh and substituting (9) into (11) delivers
rh ¼ h
h þ ehLh
1þ eh 	Lh þ Kh
h
þ 
1 ef rf  1  	Lf þ Kf
f
24 35; ðB:1Þ
Using the short-run capital return in country f and differentiating with respect to
h yields
@rh
@h
¼
f þ 1 2
 
ef Lfh iLh
h þ ehLh 	 f þ ef Lf 	 22ehLhef Lf
1 rh
1 bhð Þ 1 hð Þ2
< 0:
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The cross-border effect points to the same direction, but turns out to be smaller
than the direct domestic effect:
@rf
@h
¼ fLh
h þ ehLh 	 f þ ef Lf 	 22ehLhef Lf
1 rh
1 bhð Þ 1 hð Þ2
 0:
Note that @rf/@h< 0 only if trade is not restricted, that is > 0. Furthermore, since
both effects are negative, we can infer that an increase in symmetric fair wage
preferences across countries also reduces rh unambiguously.
Next, we determine the impact of fair wage preferences on the unemployment
rate uh:
@uh
@h
¼ rh  1
1 bhð Þ 1 hð Þ2
þ eh @rh
@h
¼
h f þ ef Lf 	
h þ ehLh 	 f þ ef Lf 	 22ehLhef Lf
1 rh
1 bhð Þ 1 hð Þ2
> 0:
For the cross-border effect we get
@uf
@h
¼ ef @rf
@h
 0:
An increase in the symmetric fair wage preference parameter  causes direct effects
(through @uh/@h) and indirect ones (through @uh/@f). As these effects point into
opposing directions, the result is ambiguous unless both countries are of equal size.
In that case, an increase in the identical fair wage parameter generates more un-
employment in both countries.
The proof for comparative static results with respect to the replacement rate bh
follows the same reasoning. h
3. Asymmetric countries
Appendix 3 sheds some light on the interaction between fair wage parameters and
tax rates when countries differ in endowments. Here, we assume that country h is
larger than country f. Figure 4 indicates that our comparative statics results for
symmetric countries also show up when market size differs. For tf= 0.3 and = 0.5
we see that equally constrained labour markets reduce the share of industry
in country i relative to perfect labour markets (= 0) if th< tf for different
levels of . The simulation exercise also confirms the finding that the tax base
responsiveness to changes in the tax rate increases with higher fair wage parameters.
4. Parametrization of the simulations for the long run
We follow Pflu¨ger (2004) in choosing the parameters = 0.6 and  = 6. To ensure
that capital returns always exceed wages, we have to set a sufficiently high
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labour-capital ratio in each country. So, Lh= Lf= 1500 and Kh=Kf= 100. We com-
pare positive fair wage parameters with = 0 to detect the impact of unemploy-
ment. We choose = 0.2 so that the change in Nash tax rates becomes visible in the
diagrams. For asymmetric country size, we increased the endowment of both
labour and capital of country h by 10% and reduced it for country f by the same
percentage.
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Fig. 4 Equilibrium industry share and tax rates
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